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Corporate fraud and managerial deception have been pervasive and value-destroying in recent decades. This
column analyses whether investors form views about a CEO’s honesty based on his or her previous actions,
and how this affects investment decisions. A CEO who has resisted, at personal cost, engaging in earnings
management is perceived as being more committed to honesty, which appeals to pro-social investors. Pro-self
investors, on the other hand, value honesty when it comes to information regarding investment returns.
Trust is a key pillar of the financial and economic
system overall. It is clear that when fraud occurs, this
is extremely damaging to firms, shareholders,
employees, and all other stakeholders. But seemingly
contradictory observations can be made regarding the
prevalence and drivers of managerial honesty. On the
one hand, from the Enron scandal to the subprime
crisis to the Bernie Madoff scam, corporate fraud and
managerial misconduct have rattled shareholder value
and investors’ trust over recent decades. Some
research argues that one out of seven large
corporations commits fraud every year, though only
the tip of the iceberg is detected (Dyck et al. 2014).
Dishonesty breeds distrust – which is particularly
important for banks because their business model
depends so much on trust. It was therefore doubly
striking when the President of the American Finance
Association, Luigi Zingales, noted in his Presidential Address (Zingales 2015), “I fear that in the
financial sector fraud has become a feature and not a bug”. Moreover, contrasting doctors and
financial service providers, he argued that “customers [of financial service institutions] are often not
seen as people to respect, but as counterparties to take to the cleaners”. 
On a more positive note, substantial honesty even in the face of incentives to the contrary can be
observed in real life. Most firms and managers do remain honest. Some individuals clearly give up
gains that could be realised from misreporting. Whistleblowers and journalists risk their careers and
sometimes their lives for bringing out the truth.  
Seeking to explain this wide variation in human behaviour, fundamental research increasingly
shows that people differ in their intrinsic preferences for honesty and in their lying costs. Research
suggests that people differ in the extent to which they regard honesty as a ‘protected value’ – that
is, as a value for which they are willing to pay a price to uphold (Gibson et al. 2013). In short, not
only the what, but also the how,matters to people.  
While these fundamental insights are interesting, from an applied perspective, the question is
whether investors – and financial service institutions – can use insights regarding the drivers of
behaviour to develop more suitable investment strategies and investment products. Also, is further
regulation required to improve ethical management and promote honest corporate cultures? Or, can
investors influence managers by making investment decisions based on perceived managerial
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honesty? 
An experiment on investor responses to managerial honesty
Our new research in Gibson et al. (2018) sheds light on these questions and suggests great
opportunities, but also some challenges for investors and companies. 
We investigate whether investors form views about a CEO’s honesty based on the that CEO’s
previous actions – and whether this affects investment decisions. To be concrete, we consider a
situation where investors see two CEOs (A and B), one who legally managed earnings to meet
market expectations in the past, and one who did not do so. Consequently, CEO A, who announced
the earnings that the market expected received a higher bonus than the other. The investors also
learn the returns the two CEOs claim to make in the future. In some situations, CEO A claims higher
returns – in others CEO B claims higher returns.
We find three sets of striking results. First, although only legally acceptable practices of earnings
management are considered, investors view CEO B, who has resisted the temptation to manage
earnings in the presence of monetary incentives to do so, as substantially more honest on average
than CEO A. But there is great variation in the assessment of CEO A’s and CEO B’s honesty by
investors, suggesting that matters such as earnings management are not easy to assess by
investors, and also that investors do have different views on this matter. 
Second, 60% of the participants in the experiment chose to invest with CEOs who did not engage in
upwards earnings management and thus passed on the opportunity to earn a higher bonus.
Strikingly, participants favoured CEOs they perceived to be more committed to honesty, even if this
implied lower promised returns. Further, the more a CEO was perceived to treat honesty as a
protected value, the less investors tended to be sensitive to the relatively higher future returns
claimed by CEOs perceived to be less honest. These results are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Investors reward managerial honesty
Investors differ in their values
Third, there is important variation in how investors regard ethical decisions, and these differences
have a substantial impact on investment choices. Specifically, some investors are ‘pro-self’, trying to
maximise their investment returns. Others are ‘pro-social’, which in this context means that they
also care about ethical goals other than their own returns. 
Pro-self investors optimise their risk-return profile. They seek higher returns as well as lower
uncertainty about claimed returns, and they trade off the two factors against each other. In other
words, to them, managerial honesty is important because it mitigates deception risk. The rationale
at work here is that CEOs with strong perceived commitment to truthful reporting are expected to
announce more reliable information regarding investment returns. Prosocial investors, by contrast,
seem to base their investment decisions directly on moral values and are largely insensitive to
financial returns. They prefer to invest with the non-earnings management-oriented CEO when they
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themselves have strong protected values for honesty, or when he is perceived as the more honest
CEO.
Implications for financial institutions, companies, investors, and
policymakers
The key implication of this line of research for financial institutions is that they should acknowledge
the importance, to their clients, of managerial honesty. The ‘know your client’ mantra of wealth
managers and banks too often considers only issues such as risk tolerance, experience and
competence, and the financial goals of the investor. Occasionally, investors’ goals or preferences
regarding environmental and social issues are considered. The present research suggests that this
misses out on an important dimension of investor preferences, namely their broader ethical values
and their concern for such values in individual CEOs. Applying these insights does not require
banks or investors to have (hard or impossible to obtain) detailed data on the values of CEOs –
what matters for investment decisions is the perception of investors. Transparent information
regarding issues revealing managerial characteristics is required to enable investors to channel
funds to firms they consider more honest. This is where policymakers and regulators have a key
role to play in setting the right disclosure requirements – but it is also important for companies to
recognise that managerial honesty can help lower their cost of capital.
In sum, from an overall financial market perspective, managerial honesty may be an important
factor that facilitates stock market participation for a variety of investor types. From a prudential
perspective, observing that broad clienteles of investors’ elect to invest with firms managed by
honest CEOs, though for different reasons, suggests that market discipline may contribute towards
curbing managerial unethical behaviours after all. Although we still know too little about these
issues, and although more research needs to be undertaken to make them concretely
implementable, ultimately the consideration of managerial honesty will enhance the role that the
financial sector can play in channelling investments where they are most effective. 
Authors’ note: This column builds on and updates an article that has appeared in the International
Banker Magazine in 2017.  
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